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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3598
___________
LINDSWORTH BROWN-SESSAY,
Petitioner
VS.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A076-576-183)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Leo A. Finston
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 22, 2013
Before: SCIRICA, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 27, 2013)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
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Lindsworth Brown-Sessay (“Sessay”),1 a native and citizen of Jamaica who is
proceeding pro se, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals‟ (“BIA”)
final order of removal. For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition in part
and deny it in part.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss the background of this case
only briefly. Sessay entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor in 1994, and
adjusted status to lawful permanent resident four years later. In 2001, he pleaded guilty
in federal court to armed bank robbery and related offenses. In 2011, the Department of
Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, charging him with being
removable for, inter alia, having been convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Sessay, through counsel, conceded the charges of removability and
ultimately applied for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). His CAT
claim centered around “his assertion that in 1999 he was involved in a drug trafficking
scheme involving a high-ranking Jamaican police official who threatened him when the
scheme went wrong and $200,000 worth of drugs went missing.” (A.R. at 4.)
After holding a merits hearing over the course of two days, the Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) denied CAT relief and ordered Sessay‟s removal to Jamaica. In doing so, the IJ
concluded that Sessay “has not offered believable, consistent testimony,” and that, “even
were the Court to find him credible, [he] has failed to meet his high burden of proving
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Brown-Sessay‟s filings refer to himself as “Sessay,”
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that it is more likely than not he will be tortured upon return to Jamaica by or with the
acquiesce[nce] of the Jamaican officials.” (Id. at 96.) On appeal, the BIA upheld the IJ‟s
denial of CAT relief, concluding that, even if Sessay were deemed credible, his CAT
claim failed because he had not met his burden of proof.
Thereafter, Sessay filed the instant petition and moved to stay his removal pending
our resolution of the petition. We denied that stay motion, and later denied his related
motion for reconsideration. His petition is now before us for disposition. The
Government argues that the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
II.
Although “we generally do not have jurisdiction to review an aggravated felon‟s
removal order,” Brandao v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 654 F.3d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)), we nonetheless retain jurisdiction to review
“constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D). “Our jurisdiction in that respect is narrowly circumscribed in that it is
limited to colorable claims or questions of law.” Pareja v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 615
F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A constitutional claim or question of law is not colorable if “„it is immaterial
and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and
frivolous.‟” Id. (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006)).
Here, Sessay‟s brief presents a host of arguments that can be construed as
asserting a legal or constitutional challenge to the agency‟s decision. We agree with the
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Government that a subset of those arguments fails to present a colorable claim.
Accordingly, we must dismiss that portion of Sessay‟s petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Although Sessay‟s remaining arguments do present colorable claims, we conclude,
after careful consideration, that none of those claims entitles him to relief. Contrary to
his assertion, the BIA‟s analysis of his CAT claim applied the appropriate standard of
review and followed the framework set forth in Kaplun v. Attorney General of the United
States, 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010). Additionally, we are not persuaded by his
claim that the agency failed to consider all of his evidence. Nor are we persuaded by his
suggestion that the IJ should have further developed the record by questioning him about
certain facts undergirding his CAT claim. Although an IJ is certainly permitted to
question the alien during a merits hearing, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1), it was Sessay‟s
counsel, not the IJ, who bore the responsibility of developing Sessay‟s CAT claim.2 See
Abulashvili v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that an IJ
“has a responsibility to function as a neutral, impartial arbiter and must refrain from
taking on the role of advocate for either party”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In light of the above, we will dismiss Sessay‟s petition in part and deny it in part.
To the extent Sessay reiterates his request for a stay of removal, that request is denied as
moot. To the extent he seeks oral argument, that request is denied as well. As for his
request that he be released from immigration custody on bond, that request is not
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properly raised here. If he wishes to challenge the legality of that custody, he may file a
habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the appropriate federal district court. See
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005). Finally, to the extent he
wishes to apply for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), he may move
the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings on that basis. We express no opinion on his
likelihood of obtaining habeas relief or succeeding on a motion to reopen.

5

